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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
By
RHITA PINTA BERLIANA SIMORANGKIR
DECEMBER 2017

Committee Chair: Dr. Paul J. Ferraro
Major Department: Economics

Two essays in this dissertation explore how developing countries effort to improve development
outcomes and to protect their forest areas affect deforestation.
The first chapter investigates the effect of a conditional cash transfers (CCT) program, a rapidly
growing poverty alleviation program in developing countries, on deforestation. Although an increasing
number of studies measure the effects of environmental programs on poverty, little empirical evidence exists
about the effects of poverty programs on the environment. I estimated the effect of substantial and
persistent income transfers to poor households in Indonesia on deforestation. To control for non-random
selection of administrative areas receiving the CCT, I combine semi-parametric matching methods, which
control for observable pre-treatment confounding characteristics, with a difference-in-differences (DID)
design that uses a fixed effect, panel data regression estimator to control for unobservable but
time-invariant confounders. This study combines administrative data from the transfers program and the
Indonesian government, remote sensing data from satellites, and a deep understanding of how the CCT was
scaled up across villages and over time. I found that exposure to the CCT decreases annual forest cover
loss in a village by an estimated 20%, on average. Thus, in Indonesia, efforts to reduce poverty can also
yield environmental co-benefits.
In the second chapter, I examine how a concerted effort to reduce deforestation in a developing
country can be successful. Whether countries with tropical forests can innovate in the policy domain to
substantially reduce deforestation is an open question. I examine this question empirically by analyzing
Brazil’s much-lauded effort to fight deforestation. In 2004, Brazil was ranked the third-largest emitter of
carbon emissions, driven largely by deforestation in the Amazon basin, the worlds largest rainforest and
home to about 10% of the worlds biodiversity. I seek to estimate the effect of a large anti-deforestation
program, the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation (PPCDAm), on deforestation in
the Brazilian Legal Amazon (BLA) by combining a synthetic control design and newly available,

high-resolution satellite panel data on global forest cover change. From 2005-2009, the PPCDAm
successfully avoided deforestation of by 88,841 km2. This avoided deforestation is associated with CO2
storage of 3,521 Mt.
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Chapter 1. Environmental Consequences of Poverty Alleviation
Programs: Evidence from Conditional Cash Transfers in Indonesia

1.1

Introduction

Given that most carbon and biodiversity-rich tropical rainforests are located in developing countries, it is
not surprising that this biome highly correlates with socio-economic poverty indicators (Fisher and
Christopher, 2007). Thus, policy makers from these countries face the competing uses of these forests: as a
repository of biodiversity and ecosystem services or as an income-generating sector (agriculture, mining,
etc.). Historically, these countries have been less focused on protecting the environment and more focused
on achieving development objectives, such as poverty reduction (Bojo and Reddy, 2002; Adams et al.,
2004).
To achieve their economic development objectives, governments are increasingly implementing
conditional cash transfers programs (CCTs). CCTs transfer cash or other resources to poor households.
These transfers are conditional on household members accomplishing specific tasks that are believed to
promote development (e.g., school attendance, pre- and post natal health care visits). Over half of the
thirty tropical countries with the most forest cover now have CCTs program, and others are planning to
create them.
Despite the widespread growth of CCTs program in ecologically-rich countries, previous research
focused on evaluating the effects of CCTs on their targeted outcomes: income, education, and health
indicators (Handa and Davis, 2006; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Barham, 2011; Glewwe and Kassouf, 2012;
Barham and Rowberry, 2013). Only one study has examined the impact of CCTs program on
environmental outcomes (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013). However, given the regression discontinuity
methodology employed by these authors, their results may not generalize to a larger affected population.
In this paper, I revisit the effect of CCTs program on deforestation and focus on a large proportion of
the affected population in the world’s top deforester country, Indonesia. The extent to which CCTs will
affect environmental outcomes in tropical countries is unknown. The poverty-deforestation hypothesis
literature has tried to identify the conditions under which changes in poverty affect deforestation rates, but
conclusions vary. For example, in the context of a theoretical model of a small-scale agricultural
producer,Angelsen (1999) concludes that when labor markets are imperfect (as they are in tropical
countries), deforestation decreases as agriculture productivity or output prices increase. Using a different
model of small-scale producers and imperfect labor markets, Zwane (2007) argues that the relationship
1

between an exogenous change in income and land clearing is ambiguous.
Given the ambiguous predictions from theory, empirical tests of the relationship between deforestation
and income-transfer programs are critical. An earlier literature attempts to estimate the relationship
between income and deforestation across countries using panel designs with random effect and fixed-effect
estimators (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; Koop and Tole, 1999). Given concerns about country-specific
unobserved characteristics that might bias the estimators in these designs, more recent studies use
within-country analysis rather than cross-country analysis (Alix-Garcia et al., 2013; Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2003; Khan and Khan, 2009; Purnamasari, 2010; Zwane, 2007). With two exceptions
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2013; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003), most of these studies do not make strong efforts to
eliminate unobserved confounding factors that affect both income and deforestation (violating exclusion
restriction for the instrumental variable approach). Without such efforts, the estimators might suffer from
endogeneity bias.
The two exceptions report conflicting conclusions about the effect of income growth on deforestation.
The results in Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) imply that overall income growth (not income growth from a
specific anti-poverty program) reduced deforestation in India through its positive impact on demand for
forest products. In contrast, the results of Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) imply that the poverty reduction from
a Mexican CCT (Oportunidades) led to an increase in deforestation. The results from the two studies may
differ because their contexts are different: Foster & Rosenzweig focus on India and do not attempt to
explain the source of income growth, whereas Alix-Garcia et al. focus on Mexico and focus on income
growth that comes from an anti-poverty program. The results may also differ because the study designs
differ: Foster & Rosenzweig use an instrumental variable design and Alix-Garcia et al. use a regression
discontinuity design. Thus each estimates a subgroup-specific local treatment effect, which may not reflect
impacts experienced in the larger population.
In light of these contradictory studies and the need for empirical studies that focus on specific
anti-poverty programs using designs capable of estimating broad program effects, I test the effect of village
level exposure to Indonesia’s CCTs program on deforestation. My analysis is motivated by the evidence
from the pilot implementation of Indonesia’s CCTs program that shows an income increase for the
beneficiary households but no effects on education or long-term health outcomes (Alatas, 2011). Since
CCTs program can conceivably affect deforestation through its income or conditionalities, the
aforementioned evidence highlights the potential mechanism through which CCTs could affect
deforestation. Through increase in income, CCTs program can have two countervailing effects on
deforestation. For some beneficiary households, additional income from the program can increase the
opportunity costs of engaging in forest extraction activity and lead to a decrease in deforestation. For
2

others, the income will ease households’ liquidity constraints and make extensive agriculture feasible, hence
increasing deforestation.
Prior research has not been able to clearly identify the causal effect of income on deforestation due to
endogeneity issues. In particular, unobserved confounding factors affect both increase in income and
deforestation. Based on the plausibly exogenous variation of increase in income from the assignment of
Indonesias CCTs program, I can estimate the effect of income on deforestation. Using this spatial variation
information in program exposure at the village level, I employed econometric methods to control for
time-varying, observable sources of bias and time-invariant unobservable sources of bias. Specifically, I
combined semi-parametric matching on observable pre-treatment confounding characteristics, followed by
panel data estimators that seek to control for unobservable, but time-invariant village-level confounders.
This study estimates a program impact that is policy-relevant for Indonesia, i.e., the average
treatment effect on the treated, which is the average impact on village-level deforestation of PKH exposure
on participating villages. Using geo-referenced, administrative data from the PKH program as well as
panel satellite data on changes in forest cover, I regressed villages’ forest cover loss on both time-varying,
observable sources of bias and time-invariant unobservable sources of bias. I found that, on average, village
exposure to the PKH decreased forest cover loss by 3.5 hectares compared to the matched untreated group
(p = 0.041).
Compared to untreated villages, villages exposed to the program have lower forest cover loss: 20% loss
annually. These results are consistent after performing robustness checks over estimation specifications.
The effect size of the PKH-treatment effect is 0.03 which is about half of the minimum effect size of studies
reported in recent reviews of payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs, which are designed
specifically to protect forests.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the key features of the Program Keluarga
Harapan and its potential effect on deforestation. Section III describes the identification strategy and the
data sources. I report summary statistics, test for balance across treated and untreated groups, and
present main results in Section IV. I conclude in section V.

1.2

The Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)

In this section, I briefly summarize the key features of the PKH; see Sparrow (2008); Alatas (2011);
BAPPENAS (2008) for a more comprehensive description. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) first
implemented a targeted household CCTs program, the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), in 2007 as a
randomized pilot. For this experimental program, the PKH was offered to randomly selected sub-districts

3

in seven provinces in Indonesia, none of which had dense forest cover. From 2008 onward, the PKH
coverage area was expanded to other provinces, including those with dense forest cover. In this study, I used
the scale up program because it includes areas with dense forest cover. In contrast to the pilot program,
the selection of the PKH sub-districts was no longer random. According to the PKH documentation
(Sparrow, 2008; Alatas, 2011), the GOI used observable criteria to assign the PKH at the sub-district level.
The PKH transfers cash to mothers in poor households on a quarterly basis. The amount of annual
transfer varies between 600,000 to 2,200,000 rupiahs, which translates to 45 to 165 USD, based on
household eligibility conditions. These amounts are equivalent to 15 to 20 percent of the estimated
consumption of poor households. To be eligible to receive the PKH transfers, a household must be
categorized as ”extremely poor” and must have either one or more of the following conditions: i) pregnant
or lactating mothers, ii) child aged less than 6 years, iii) children of primary school age, iv) children of
secondary school age.
By attaching the cash transfers to health and education obligations, the PKH aims to improve
extremely poor households’ human capital and break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The
health obligations include pre-natal check-ups, iron tablet consumption, and birth assistance by a trained
professional for pregnant mothers. Lactating mothers have to compete post-natal care visits. Households
with children aged 0-6 years must complete childhood immunizations, take vitamin A and fulfill
growth-monitoring check-ups. To meet the education obligations, households with children aged 6-15 years
must enroll their children at either primary school or junior secondary school and the children must attend
a minimum of 85% of the school days. Finally, households with children aged 16-18 years who have not
completed nine years of primary and secondary school must enroll their children in an education program
to complete the requisite amount of education.
1.2.1

Mechanisms

The PKH can affect deforestation both through the cash transfers and the conditionalities attached to the
PKH. Figure 1.1 summarizes the mechanisms through which CCT could affect deforestation.
Cash transfers from the program relax households’ budget constraints. For agricultural households
with non-separable production and consumption functions and liquidity constraints, exogenous income
transfers would likely change household decisions in both production and consumption sectors (Singh et al.,
1986). In rural areas in developing countries, liquidity and credit constraints limit spending on investment,
consumption, and the choice of income generating activities (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Barrett et al.,
2005). In the case of Indonesia, Bazzi et al. (2015) analyze liquidity constraints for poor households who
reduced their expenditure upon receiving delayed unconditional cash transfers. This finding suggests that
4
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Figure 1.1: Directed Acyclic Graph of CCT’s Effect on Deforestation
cash transfers affect poor households’ consumption decisions and their consumption-smoothing pattern in
the absence of credit access.
Furthermore, the absence of an agricultural insurance market in these areas limits households’ ability
to smooth their consumption. Due to income volatility in the agricultural sector, poor households with
limited credit access diversify their activities to smooth income fluctuations (Dercon, 2002); for example
they may use forest products to generate additional income. Several studies show empirical analyses on the
use of forest products as a coping mechanism to mitigate income shocks for low-income households in the
Brazilian Amazon (Pattanayak and Sills, 2001), in Peru (Takasaki et al., 2004), and in Malawi (Fisher and
Shively, 2005). Regular cash transfers from the PKH could potentially alter their consumption smoothing
strategy by discouraging forest products use, therefore decreasing deforestation.
Conditional cash transfers might also affect citizens’ reciprocity. In one example, conditional cash
transfers program affect how people reciprocate to the elected party providing the program (Galiani et al.,
2016). Observing that villagers in Indonesia have high awareness of negative environmental impacts of
deforestation (Meijaard et al., 2013), they migh reciprocate the government’s cash transfers program by
not deforesting. Along with the cash transfers, PKH’s conditionalities and monitoring could also affect
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deforestation through changes in household labor supply and perceived scrutiny.

1.2.2

Selection of PKH

To identify the causal effects of the PKH on deforestation, this study exploits the way in which the PKH
was scaled up over time and space (see Figure 1.2).

Province

Poverty Incidence

Districts

Number of the PKH-eligible HHs Supply-Side Readiness: Health and Education Facilities

Sub-districts

Dosage: Number of PKH-eligible Households

Villages

Figure 1.2: The PKH Assignment
To understand how the PKH was implemented, I read through written documentation on the PKH
assignment. Then, to verify and deepen my understanding of the PKH assignment, I conducted a field
survey in August 2016. The survey comprised interviews with the PKH program administrators in Jakarta,
and surveys of head of villages in forested areas in Bali, Sumatera, and Kalimantan.
Written documents from the early implementation of the PKH describe the central government first
assigning PKH eligibility to a province, which is the largest administrative unit, based on several province
attributes: poverty rate, proportion urban, proximity to the coast or islands, and access (Sparrow, 2008).
Within a province, eligible districts were selected based on development considerations including a high
incidence of poverty and a high incidence of poor health and education outcomes, and approval from the
district government. Eligible sub-districts were selected based on the number of PKH-eligible households
and a sub-district’s ”supply-side readiness,” as defined by the central government. Supply-side readiness
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referred to a sub-district’s ability to accomodate the potential increased demand for health and education
services. To determine a sub-district’s supply-side readiness, the GOI assessed existing health and
education facilities and providers.
To confirm the assignment criteria described in the written documents, I asked the PKH program
administrators (UPPKH) at the Social Ministry of Republic of Indonesia to describe the criteria used for
assigning the PKH to a sub-district. Their responses match the written documents, with some additional
details. In the scaling up phase of the PKH, the number of the PKH eligible households played an
important role in determining the assignment of the PKH to a sub-district. Among the supply-side ready
sub-districts, sub-districts with a high number of the PKH eligible households were prioritized to receive
the PKH earlier than others. This prioritization arose from pressure to expand the PKH to cover all of the
provinces in Indonesia and the PKH’s budget constraint. The PKH administrator at a sub-district level of
administration, which is a unit that is independent of general administrative government, gives the PKH
directly to eligible PKH households. This targeting procedure implies that not all of villages in the PKH
assigned sub-district received the PKH. Only villages with eligible PKH households received the PKH.
Figure 1.2 shows how the central government assigned the PKH from a province to a village level.
One of the concern on applying these observable criteria is that villages might manipulate their
poverty level in order to receive the PKH assignment. This manipulation might confound the PKH
assignment and deforestation. Fortunately, the PKH was assigned on a top-down approach, meaning that
the PKH’s program administrator at the central government assign the PKH to a lower level of
administrator. Furthermore, the list of eligible households was drawn from survey conducted in 2005, two
years prior to the PKH implementation. Hence, it is unlikely that village officials can influence the PKH
assignment in their own village.

1.3

Identification Strategy & Data

Using a potential outcome framework, I identified the causal effect of the PKH on forest cover loss in
Indonesia by estimating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). The ATT represents the
effect of the PKH on forest cover change in those villages that were exposed to the PKH.
Formally, forest cover loss is denoted as Y, while the PKH is denoted as D. Treatment takes on two
values: D=1 indicates PKH assignment while D=0 indicates PKH non-assignment. The Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) is defined as:
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AT T = E[Y1 − Y0 | D = 1]

(1)

where [Y1 | D = 1] = the observed outcome of the treated unit in the presence of the intervention and
[Y0 | D = 1] = the counterfactual outcome of the treated unit in the absence of the intervention.
Since one can never observe the counterfactual outcome of the treated unit in the absence of
intervention, randomized allocation of the treatment to some units ensures that the expected outcome of
the untreated group is equal to the expected counterfactual outcome for the treated group. In other words,
if the assignment of the PKH to villages were random, a simple estimator of the difference in mean
outcomes between PKH and non-PKH villages is an unbiased estimator of the ATT.
In the forested areas of Indonesia, however, the assignment of the PKH was not random. With
non-random assignment, the expected changes in forest cover loss in PKH and non-PKH villages are likely
to be different in the absence of the PKH. To obtain appropriate counterfactuals for the treated villages,
this paper controls for different baseline characteristics that affect both the PKH assignment and changes
in forest cover loss. These characteristics are chosen based on the PKH selection criteria for villages and
historical forest cover loss. The associated estimand becomes:

AT T = E[Y1 − Y0 | X, D = 1]

(2)

The treated group consists of villages that received the PKH from 2008 to 2012. I constructed a
counterfactual group for the PKH treated villages from villages that did not receive the PKH by the end of
2012 within the same provinces. Equation (2) means that once I conditioned on X, the treatment
assignment is ”as if” randomly assigned. According to Heckman et al. (1998), the lowest bias values arise
when X includes a set of variables that affect both program participation and the outcome. Thus, the
conditioning set X comprises observable PKH-assignment indicators and forest change outcomes, including
pre-treatment forest losses and forest cover. Pre-treatment outcomes are included in the observed
conditioning set to block a variety of back-door paths via unobservable variables that affect forest cover in
both the past and the future.

1.3.1

Identifying Assumptions

In order to make a causal inference, this study assumes that the potential outcomes for any unit do not
vary regardless of the assignment mechanism used and regardless of treatments received by other units,
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formally known as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). Based on Rubin (1980),
SUTVA is satisfied when there is no interference between units leading to different outcomes depending on
the treatments other units received and there are no versions of treatments leading to technical errors.
SUTVA and other assumptions discussed later are not directly informed by observations Imbens and Rubin
(2015). However, in this study,one might worry that the PKH transfers might generate general equilibrium
effect in which transfers received by a household might affect other households that did not receive the
PKH. This study makes SUTVA more credible by defining the unit to be the village within which eligible
PKH households interact.
Furthermore, to consistently estimate the ATT, Heckman et al. (1997) suggest several assumptions
that need to be maintained: (i) Conditional Independence Assumption; (ii) Common Support Assumption.
To identify the ATT parameter, we need the assumption of conditional independence of Y0 given X; i.e.,
|=

(Y0 ) D | X. Estimate of Y0 for units with D=1 would be inferred from data on units with D=0. Given
the conditional independence assumption is true, Heckman et al. (1997) show that the outcomes of
untreated units will have the same distributions with treated units if they were not participated in the
program, after conditioning on X. Thus, if the mean exists:

E[Y0 | X, D = 1] = E[Y0 | X, D = 0] = E[Y0 | X]

(3)

Equation (3) means that the expected outcome of the untreated group, the group that did not receive
the treatment, is a valid counterfactual of expected outcome for the treated group.
The common support assumption means that the probability of participating and not participating is
bounded away from zero and one. This assumption rules out the perfect predictability of the treatment
assignment, D, after conditioning for X. To estimate ATT, we only need the possibility of a non-participant
for each participant (Smith and Todd, 2005). Thus, the common support is:

P (D = 1 | X) < 1

(4)

In this paper, I used a sensitivity analysis that assumes that the selection on observables provides
information on the selection on unobservables. This method was originally developed by (Altonji et al.,
2005) and later on extended by Oster (2016). In addition to observing coefficient movements, Oster
formally incorporated the R-squared movements in the bias adjustment calculation to evaluate the
robustness of the specification from omitted variable bias. By setting the maximum R-squared to 1.3 of the
observed R-squared and the estimated of the treatment coefficient to zero, I can calculate the degree of
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selection on unobservables relative to observables, , that would be necessary to have a zero treatment
effect. Altonji et al. suggest a threshold point of equals to one. This threshold suggests that the
observables are at least as important as the unobservables. Finally, I assume that if there exist any
unobservable confounders, they are time-invariant.
1.3.2

Pre-processing using Matching and Fixed Effect Panel Design

To address the concern about bias from non-random treatment assignment, I pre-processed the data using
a matching algorithm that strives to make the treated and untreated villages similar on key observable
characteristics known to affect both assignment to the PKH and forest cover change (Ho et al., 2007).
Pre-processing using matching adjusts the data for potential confounding factors semi-parametrically. The
adjustment of the data requires the inclusion of observable characteristics, X, that affect the selection of
area into the PKH recipients and forest cover change in the matching process.
The propensity score estimate is consistent only if matching on the associated propensity score
asymptotically balances the observed covariates (Ho et al., 2007). To achieve covariates balance,
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) recommend iteratively checking if matching on the estimated propensity
score produces balance by revising the specification of the propensity score until covariate imbalance is
minimized. Since matching does not use outcome data in the post-treatment period, the practice of
iteratively checking and revising the specification to minimized covariate imbalance is permissible (Rubin,
2008).
Genetic Matching (Diamond and Sekhon, 2012) is a matching algorithm that eliminates the need to
manually and iteratively checks the propensity score. It is a generalization of propensity score and
Mahalanobis distance (MD) matching algorithm. Genetic Matching automates the iterative process of
checking and improving overall covariate balance and guarantees asymptotic convergence to the optimal
matched sample. It may or may not decrease the bias in the conditional estimates.
In contrast with experimental studies, the existence of a set of observed conditioning variables that
satisfy both conditional independence and common support assumptions is not guaranteed in observational
studies. Balance in conditioning set X between treated and untreated groups is traditionally used as an
indirect test for the conditional mean independence assumption. I assess balance using graphs and
normalized differences between treated and untreated groups.
In most observational studies, untreated matches for a fraction of treated units cannot be found, thus,
violating equation (4). In this case, there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for D=1 and
D=0 groups. When there is a minimal overlap in the distribution of propensity score between treated an
untreated groups, matching with replacement produce estimates that are closer to experimental estimates
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(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Several ways are suggested to impose the region of common support. Smith
and Todd (2005) suggest trimming to determine the support region. One drawback of this method is the
estimated treatment effect will no longer be generalized to the entire region. Alternatively, I can impose a
common support condition by using a caliper matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973).
To test how sensitive the analysis to a hidden bias, I relax the unconfoundedness assumption. From
this unconfoundedness, I obtained a range of plausible values for the estimand with the width of these
ranges corresponding to the extent to which I allow the unconfoundedness assumption to be violated.
Matching is unlikely to remove all of the bias in the estimator, both because of imperfect matching in
finite samples and because of unobservable confounding factors. Following the suggestion of Ho et al.
(2007), I impose parametric procedures on the pre-processed data set. Specifically, this study uses a fixed
effect panel design to mitigate the confounding effects of unobservable, time-invariant characteristics.
Suppose there exists forest cover loss spillover among sub-districts; fixed effect panel regression design helps
remove the constant spillover. As fixed effect panel regression design assumes homogenous treatment
effects, the treated and untreated units respond similarly, on average, to common shocks. To the extent
that treatment effect heterogeneity and responses to common shocks are a function of observable
characteristics and time-invariant unobservable characteristics, the combined designs of pre-processing
using matching and fixed effect panel regression will make these assumptions more plausible (Ferraro and
Miranda, 2017).
To estimate the effect of a poverty alleviation program on forest cover, this paper uses the
difference-in-differences (DID) method using fixed effect panel regression design. Using treated and
matched untreated units, ATT is estimated by the difference on forest cover outcome between these two
groups.

Yit = β0 + β1 P KHit + β2 Xit + αi + γt + it

(5)

The unit of analysis in this paper is the village level of administration. Yit is the forest cover loss in
village i at year t from panel data, 2001 to 2012. The coefficient of interest is β1 , which indicates the effect
of exposure to the PKH program on Yit . To help improve the precision of the estimator, Xit comprises two
time-varying characteristics that are known to affect agriculture and thus forest cover loss: average
temperature and precipitation rate. The fixed effect, αi , captures a villages unobserved time-invariant
characteristics that can affect exposure to the PKH and forest cover loss. The time variable, γt , represents
national-level time-varying characteristics that affect forest cover loss. The random error term is
represented by it .
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The unit of analysis is the village, but the PKH was assigned to a sub-district, which comprises
several villages. To control for intra-sub-district correlation, I estimate standard errors clustered at the
sub-district level.

1.3.3

Data

Outcome. I use forest cover loss from Hansen et al. (2013) as a measure of deforestation within a village.
Forest cover loss is defined as the complete removal of tree cover (a stand-replacement disturbance). Tree
cover is indicated by a Landsat pixel covered by all vegetation higher than 5 meters in the beginning of a
year (January) at or above a 75% threshold of canopy cover. Hansen’s dataset was obtained from a
high-resolution satellite, Landsat 7, at a spatial resolution of 30*30 meters to measure forest cover change
from 2000 to 2012 globally. This dataset provides a uniform and consistent measure of forest cover and
forest loss for all global land at a small spatial resolution.
To obtain a dataset on forest cover change for each village in Indonesia, I overlaid the Hansen data set
with Indonesias 2013 village boundaries (Statistics Indonesia) using the gfcanalysis package in R (Zvoleff,
2015). Combining these two datasets minimizes forest cover interpolation around the village’s boundaries.
Since the spatial resolution of the Hansen dataset is sufficiently small, I can measure in details the
variation of forest cover across villages. This study overlaps Hansens data with the Indonesia’s 2013 village
boundary using gfcanalysis package in R (Zvoleff, 2015). The spatial mapping of the treated villages was
created using geographical information software ArcGIS 10.3. The resulting data set consists of a panel of
treated and untreated villages forest cover loss from 2001 to 2012. Figure 1.3 and 1.4 show the overlapping
of these two datasets.
Treated Villages. In this paper, treated village is defined as a village that received the PKH between
2008 and 2012 and had a positive forest cover in 2001. Untreated villages are the villages with positive
forest cover in 2001 that did not receive the PKH by 2012. The list of villages that received the PKH from
2008 to 2012 was obtained from the State Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS). This
treated village dataset gives a village identification using the name and the official 2014 village code from
Statistic Indonesia. After the implementation of a regional autonomy law in Indonesia in 2000
(Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004), Indonesia experienced a proliferation of administrative areas.
The proliferation ranged from the establishment of new villages to the creation of new districts. Given this
proliferation, the village names or codes could change over time. For this reason, I collapsed the treated
villages to village names and codes in 2007. I chose this year because the targeting of the PKH was based
on the condition in 2007, the beginning of the PKH implementation.
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Figure 1.3: High-resolution Satelite Mapping (Hansen, 2013)

Figure 1.4: Village Boundaries (Statistics Indonesia, 2013)
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All villages in the sample areas received the PKH starting from 2008, except the villages in one district
in West Sumatera. This particular district in West Sumatera has been removed from the sample because it
received the PKH in the pilot program. Hence, the treatment period of the overall sample starts in 2008.
Administrative Selection Variables. The administrative selection variables consist of three observable
characteristics obtained from TNP2K. These variables include the number of PKH-eligible characteristics,
access to health facilities, and access to education facilities in sub-district level of administration. These
variables were obtained from The National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K). This
team is one of the coordination team that implements PKH in Indonesia.
Pre-treatment Outcomes. Pre-treatment forest loss used in this paper goes back to 2 years before the
treatment period. Moreover, this study matches on the forest cover at the beginning of the treatment year.
This covariate serves as a normalization of the extent of the forest cover loss across villages.
Others. Another covariate used for the pre-processing using matching is the length of roads within a
village in 2010. Proximity to road has been an important factor affecting deforestation in many tropical
countries (Ferretti-Galon and Busch, 2014). Hence, I included length of road as the matching covariate.
Table 1.1 summarizes data and the sources of the data.

1.4

Results

1.4.1

Balance Test and Summary Statistics

In my analysis, I performed matching within a province and then merged the matched samples for all 16
provinces into a single data set. Table 1.2 reports the covariate balance statistics before and after
matching. As expected given the targeting of the PKH, the treated group has a higher number of
PKH-eligible households and higher access to health and education facilities compared to the untreated
group. The treated group also has, on average, lower pre-treatment forest cover loss and shorter length of
road compared to the untreated group.
After matching, the differences between treated and untreated groups are smaller. Column (5) in
Table 1.2 shows the mean differences in covariates between treated and treated groups while column (7)
shows the normalized differences. Following the suggestion from Imbens and Rubin (2015) (as cited in
Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)), I use the normalized difference threshold of 0.25 to judge the sensitivity of
the specification.
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Table 1.1: Data and Sources
Variable

Source

Forest loss & forest cover 2001-2012
Village boundaries 2013
PKH villages
Number of eligible households in a sub-district
Access to health facilities in a sub-district
Access to education facilities in a sub-district
Road length in 2010
Precipitation rate
Yearly average surface temperature
Slope
Palm oil concessions
Wood fiber concessions
Logging concessions
Protected areas 2010

Hansen et.al. (2013) version 1.2
Statistics Indonesia
The State Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS)
the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)
the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)
the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC)
TRMM 3B43 V.7
M2TMNXFLX V5.12.4
SRTM 90m Digital Elevation Database v.4.1
Indonesia Ministry of Forestry accessed through Global Forest Watch
Indonesia Ministry of Forestry accessed through Global Forest Watch
Indonesia Ministry of Forestry accessed through Global Forest Watch
World Database of Protected Areas

Table 1.2: Covariates Balance with Unmatched and Matched Samples

Variables
(1)
Number of PKH-Eligible HHs
Access to Health Facilities
Access to Education Facilities
Forest Loss 2006
Forest Loss 2007
Forest Loss 2008
Forest Cover 2008
Road Length 2010

Slope
Village Area (sqkm)

Matched
Unmatched
(2)

Mean
Treated
(3)

Mean
Untreated
(4)

Mean
Difference
(5)

Normalized
Difference
(6)

U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M

662.059
662.059
0.862
0.862
0.852
0.852
10.85
10.85
12.981
12.981
13.182
13.182
802.640
802.640
0.789
0.789

334.784
592.975
0.842
0.866
0.824
0.856
45.514
12.291
46.771
11.84
47.165
13.134
2582.812
787.789
1.206
0.732

327.275
69.084
0.02
-0.004
0.028
-0.004
-34.664
-1.441
-33.79
1.142
-33.983
0.048
-1780.172
14.851
-0.417
0.051

0.761
0.132
0.111
-0.024
0.168
0.03
-0.18
0.017
-0.142
0.015
-0.188
0.001
-0.204
0.005
-0.176
0.032

-0.938
-0.178
-22.517
0.485

-0.199
-0.042
-0.222
0.013

Other Covariates not including in Matching
U
3.594
4.532
M
3.594
3.773
U
14.896
37.412
M
14.896
14.336
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The most severly imbalanced variable is also the most important for PKH assignment: the number of
PKH-eligible households. After matching, the balance is greatly improved, falling below the 0.25 threshold.
The improvement in covariate balance can be seen directly from the kernel density functions in Figure 1.5.
Compared to the treated group’s density, the density of the untreated group is much farther to the left.
After matching, it overlaps well with the trated group.
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Figure 1.5: Density Function of Number of PKH Eligible HHs
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Figure 1.6 shows the common trends in pre-treatment forest cover loss between treated and untreated
villages. The PKH was first assigned in the forested area in Indonesia in 2008. Prior to 2008, the annual
means of forest cover loss for the treated group, the orange solid line, is much lower than for the
unmatched untreated group, the blue dashed line. It also follows a different trend, which makes the
identifying assumptions of the fixed effects, panel data estimator less plausible: if pre-treatment trends of
treated and control units were not, on average, similar prior to treatment assignment, it is harder to belive
that, in the post-treatment period, the untreated group’s trend represents the counterfactual trend of the
treated group in the absence of treatment (conditional on weather variables). In contrast, the level and
trend of forest loss for the untreated group, the teal dotted line, closely follows those of the treated group.
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Figure 1.6: Pre-Treatment Forest Loss (2001-2008)
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Common Support. To ascertain the plausibility of the common support assumption, I observe the
graphical representation of the propensity scores densities of both treated and untreated groups. Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2005) point out that graphical analysis is sufficient to see the common support. Looking at
Figure 1.7, it is clear that the treated and untreated groups share overlapping regions. Furthermore, I
performed multiple common support tests, including trimming outliers of the common support in terms of
propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005), imposing common support while performing genetic
matching within a province. similar approach proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and inmpsing
caliper matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973). The results in Appendix (Table A1) from all of these tests
suggest reduction in forest cover loss in PKH-treated villages compared to untreated villages.
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Figure 1.7: Density Function of Propensity Scores Before Matching
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1.4.2

FE Results

Table 1.3 presents the estimates of PKH treatment effects on village level forest loss. After matching,
column (2-4), Village exposure to the PKH decreases forest loss by an estimated 3.53 hectares (p=0.04).
Removing villages that are located in districts that are categorized as cities by the GOI column(5-7), the
estimated impact declines to 3.5 ha (p=0.049).
Table 1.4 presents estimated treatment effects by forest type. Community forest, refers to village
forests outside of concession and protected areas. Forest concessions consist of logging and wood fiber
concessions. Estimated reductions in forest loss are largest in the community forests (2.3 Ha, p=0.058),
followed by forest concessions (1.15 Ha, p=0.001), and protected areas (0.07 Ha, p=0.051). The estimated
effect of the PKH in palm oil concessions is positive (0.13 Ha, p=0.630) although it is very imprecisely
estimated and thus much less informative that the other estimates.

Table 1.3: Fixed Effect Regression Results
Main Estimate

Covariates
Coefficient
(1)
PKH
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(2)
-3.530**
(1.723)
-26.18***
(8.316)

Rural Villages

95 % Confidence Interval
LB
(3)
-6.911

UB
(4)
-0.150

-42.49

-9.867

205,530
0.007

Coefficient
(5)
-3.517**
(1.787)
-30.02***
(9.413)

95 % Confidence Interval
LB
(6)
-7.023

UB
(7)
-0.0103

-48.49

-11.56

192,998
0.007

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Fixed effect controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies
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Table 1.4: Forest Types
Covariates
(1)
PKH

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Community Forest
(2)
-2.347*
(1.284)
[-4.954 - 0.0808]
-20.63**
(6.219)
[-32.82 - -8.440]

Forest Concession
(3)
-1.148***
(0.348)
[-1.830 - -0.467]
-2.578**
(1.302)
[-5.129 - -0.0263]

Palm Oil Concession
(4)
0.128
(0.265)
[-0.391 - 0.647]
-3.261***
(1.104)
[-5.425 - -1.097]

Protected Areas
(5)
-0.0732*
(0.0375)
[-0.147 - 0.000265]
0.289
(0.207)
[-0.116 - 0.694]

205,530
0.007

205,530
0.005

205,530
0.001

205,530
0.001

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Fixed effect controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies

1.4.3

Robustness Checks

Eventually Treated Sample. I performed robustness check by estimating the effect of the PKH to those
villages that eventually received the PKH by 2012. I performed this robustness check because those villages
that eventually received the PKH were the best matches for the treated villages. In implementation, I
removed untreated villages that never got treated by the end of 2012. Furthermore, I assumed that the
year in which a village is selected for treatment is ”as if randomly assigned” after conditioning on
community fixed effect and year effects. Table 1.5 shows the result that the PKH reduced forest loss by
almost 5 Ha (p=0.006), a coefficient movement of almost 39%. As an alternative, I also performed random
effect panel regression estimate on this eventually treated sample controlling for administrative selection
covariates (number of eligible PKH households, access to health facilities, and access to education
facilities), geographical characteristics (length of roads, slope, elevation), weather covariates (average
temperature and precipitation), and year effects. I performed estimation on this specification becaue it
allows the inclusion of the selection covariates. The result suggests that the PKH reduces forest cover loss
by 5.1 Ha (p=0.006), a similar estimate to the FE specification. In conclusion, these results emphasize the
deforestation-reducing effect of the PKH.
Removing Neighbors. Theoretically, income increase in the PKH villages can increase demand that
then increases local agricultural prices. Following the method to reduce the bias from spatial spillover by
Andam et al. (2008), I removed untreated villages that shared boundaries with the treated villages and
performed matching with the new set of untreated units. Figure 1.8 shows the graphical representation of
the immediate neighbors in one of the sixteen provinces. The red polygons represent the PKH-treated
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villages, the blue polygons represent untreated villages that shared boundaries with PKH-treated villages,
and the white polygons represent the untreated villages. I removed PKH-untreated neighbors, the blue
polygons. From 16 provinces, I removed 2,142 untreated villages that correspond to 7% from total
untreated villages. In the appendix, I present the covariate balance after removing untreated neighbors.
Similar as the matching specification, normalized differences across covariates are lower than 0.25 after
matching. Column 3 in Table 1.5 shows the results after removing untreated neighbors. The result shows
reduction in forest cover loss and roughly similar estimate with coefficient movement of 26.6%.

Table 1.5: Robustness Checks

Covariates
(1)
PKH

Constant

Observations
R-squared

a

Eventually Treated Sample
a

Removing Neighbors

FE
(2)
-4.935***
(1.796)
[-8.462 - -1.408]
-19.56***
(9.832)
[-38.87 - -0.250]

RE
(3)
-5.134***
(1.884)
[-8.826 - -1.442]
1.828
(12.22)
[-22.11 - 25.77]

FE
(4)
-2.590
(1.771)
[-6.064 - 0.884]
-21.72***
(8.205)
[-37.82 - -5.625]

102,765
0.008

102,765

205,530
0.008

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies
Additional controls: administrative selection variables and geographical characteristics

Figure 1.8: Removing Immediate Neighbors
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Sensitivity Analysis. One of the concerns from estimating ATT in observational settings is that,
despite all of my efforts to eliminate sources of bias from confounding variables, the design might still suffer
from omitted variable bias. In order to test the sensitivity of the specification to this bias, I measured the
degree of selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables, δ developed by (Oster, 2016). In
order to perform this sensitivity analysis, I took the matched samples and estimated the OLS from the
cross section data. I regress the PKH assignment and matching covariates on forest cover loss in 2012.
Then, I asked how large a δ has to be in order to change my estimate by performing psacalc command in
stata. I use δ = 1 as the rule of thumb proposed by (Altonji et al., 2005) to measure the degree of selection
on unobservables compared to the selection on observables. If δ = 1, the unobservable variable has to be as
strong as the observable covariates in the regression specifications to alter the estimate. Table 1.6 shows
the results for this sensitivity analysis. Column (4) shows the magnitude of delta to change the treatment
effect to zero. Since delta is substantially higher than 1, my specification is not sensitive to hidden bias. In
order to change the estimate to a positive value (Column (5)), delta is also substantialy higher than one.
In conclusion, the primary result is not sensitive to hidden bias.

Table 1.6: Sensitivity Analysis (Rmax = 1.3R2 )
Specification
(1)
Main Estimate
Rural Villages

1.4.4

Baseline effect (Std. error) [R2 ]
(2)
-5.099*** (1.564)
[0.4746]
-5.71*** (1.778)
[0.4906]

Rmax
(3)

δ̃ for β = 0
(4)

δ̃ for β = −β̂
(5)

0.61698

-20.41356

-42.15367

0.63778

-14.78526

-29.79117

Heterogeneity

The estimated overal average causal effect of the PKH on deforestation is informative yet of limited value
Imai and Ratkovic (2013). In order to investigate when the treatments do and do not work, I explored the
heterogeneity of treatment effect to test for the existence of lack there of heterogenous treatment effects
and to choose sub-populations for which a treatment is effective or harmful. In terms of the relation
between income from poverty alleviation progam and deforestation, previous work documented a non-linear
relationship between income and deforestation Dasgupta et al. (2002). Hence, subpopulations of with high
and low baseline poverty level is one of the subpopulation of interest. Moreover, geographical characteristics
have consistently listed as determining factor of deforestation Ferretti-Galon and Busch (2014). Thus, I
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also explored the heterogeneity in sub-populations reside in different geographical characteristics.
In table 1.7, I examined the heterogeneity of the effect of the PKH by baseline poverty level of the
sub-district where PKH villages are located. I divided the sample into low versus high baseline poverty
villages using the median number of PKH-eligible households. I found no systematic differences in the
treatment effects of the PKH on deforestation. In particular, the point estimates of the effect of the PKH
are all negative for both villages with low and high baseline poverty. I also explored heterogeneity of the
PKH effect by the village’s geographical conditions, including slope and village area. Table 1.8 presents the
results for heterogeneity in geographical characteristics. In conclusion, the deforestation-reducing effect of
the PKH exposures to villages appears to be homogenous across the subgroups examined in my analysis.
Table 1.7: Fixed Effect Regression Results: Heterogeneity in Baseline Poverty
Low Baseline Poverty

Covariates

Coefficient
(1)

(2)
-2.447
(1.982)
-20.21*
(12.15)
99,684
0.009

PKH
Constant
Observations
R-squared

High Baseline Poverty

95 % Confidence Interval
LB
(3)
-6.337

UB
(4)
1.443

-44.06

3.630

Coefficient
(5)
-3.415
(2.333)
-25.80*
(12.53)
105,846
0.008

95 % Confidence Interval
LB
(6)
-7.996

UB
(7)
1.167

-50.41

-1.198

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Fixed effect controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies

Table 1.8: Fixed Effect Regression Results: Heterogeneity in Geographical Characteristics
Slope

Covariates
(1)
PKH

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Village Area

Low
(2)
-2.726
(2.478)
[-7.588 - 2.136]
-32.17**
(12.70)
[-57.09 - -7.255]

High
(3)
-3.359*
(1.837)
[-6.693 - 0.246]
-27.15***
(9.082)
[-44.97 - -9.324]

Low
(4)
-1.048
(0.778)
[-2.574 - 0.478]
-8.421**
(3.985)
[-16.24 - -0.600]

High
(5)
-4.832*
(2.808)
[-10.34 - 0.677]
-40.31***
(14.18)
[-68.12 - -12.49]

102,700
0.006

102,830
0.010

102,700
0.008

102,830
0.012

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Fixed effect controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies
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1.5

Discussion and Conclusion

Due to a high spatial overlap between poverty and biodiversity regions (Fisher and Christopher, 2007),
understanding the effect of poverty reduction to environmental outcomes becomes crucial. How poverty
alleviation programs might affect environmental outcomes has been difficult to answer due to the
endogeneity between poverty and forest cover. This paper evaluated the environmental consequences of
poverty alleviation program in a developing country. In contrast with prior work evaluating CCTs in
Mexico, this study found that village exposure to the CCT reduced forest loss by 20%. This finding is
robust after adjusting for potential spillover, overlapping regions of common support, and hidden bias.
This opposite conclusion could arise from different contexts (Mexico vs. Indonesia) or from different study
designs. The estimand for this Indonesia study is the average treatment effect on the treated villages. The
estimand for the Mexico study is a local average treatment effect around an eligibility threshold based on a
poverty index, i.e., it measures the treatment effect for only communities just above or just below the
eligibility threshold.
Exploring heterogeneity of treatment effects from baseline poverty levels, slope and village areas, a
village exposure to the PKH reduces forest loss. Finally, compared to the effect sizes from payment for
environmental services (PES), an environmental program that was designed specifically to protect forests,
the effect size from the PKH (0.03) was half of the minimum effect size of studies evaluating PES (0.06).
Future research should attempt to isolate the mechanisms through which a poverty alleviation
program like the PKH can affect deforestation. In a developing country like Indonesia, most of poor people
in rural areas work in agricultural sector. Income in agricultural sector is known to be seasonal and tend to
fluctuate. Poor people who have limited access to credit often use forest products to cope with income
fluctuations from agricultural sector. The regular cash transfers from the PKH might decrease the pressure
on forest.
This paper shows that in the context of Indonesia, effort to reduce poverty is followed by
environmental benefits. The treatment effect estimated in this paper is policy relevant as it uses a large
and heterogeneous sample from all the administrative units that have received the PKH. As Indonesia
currently has no carefully designed environmental policies, the income from the PKH helps reducing the
pressure deforest.
This study contributes to the sparse literature on the environmental impacts of development
programs. It also contributes to a more accurate and informative model of regional deforestation models in
Asia because it uses variation in village-level data. This study also finds that a CCT program can have a
wide range of impacts that go beyond the program objectives.
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Chapter 2. A Synthetic Control Design to Estimate the Impact of
Brazil’s Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm)

2.1

Introduction

Emission from deforestation has been a significant contributor of global greenhouse gas emissions (Seymour
and Busch, 2016). A traditional policy approach to slow down deforestation has heavily relied on protected
areas and other area based conservation practice. These approaches have successfully reduced deforestation
(Andam et al., 2008; Adams et al., 2004; Ferraro et al., 2013; Jayachandran et al., 2017; Sims and
Alix-Garcia, 2016), but the magnitude of the reduction is modest. In the absence of innovations in forest
conservation policy, an area the size of India will be cleared each year in the near future (Busch and
Engelmann, 2015). Whether countries with tropical forests can innovate in the policy domain to
substantially reduce these expected losses is an open question.
I examine this question empirically by analyzing Brazil’s much lauded effort to fight deforestation.
Brazil is an ideal setting because it has the world’s largest tropical rainforests - the Amazon- and had
experienced some of the world’s highest deforestation rates for decades. To combat this deforestation in the
Amazon, the Brazilian government implemented, in 2004, the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control
of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon, known by its Portugues acronym as the PPCDAm. Executed
through a colaboration among thirteen ministries, the PPCDAm comprises a set of initiatives for
monitoring, enforcement, and territorial management (Assunção et al., 2015). These initiatives include a
satellite-based monitoring system, additional personnel for field-level monitoring and enforcement
activities, land tenure policy changes, restrictions on agricultural credit to illegal deforesters, and a
blacklist of municipalities that account for 45% of Amazonian deforestation.
This large, anti-deforestation program aimed to reduce, by 2020, deforestation to 20% of its historical
average between 1996 and 2005. During this period, 19,625 km2 was deforested annually, an area roughly
the size of the State of New Jersey (average is calculated from data published by the Brazilian
Government; PRODES, INPE). By 2010, the annual deforestation rate had been cut to 7,000 km2 , a
reduction of more than 60%. Because of this dramatic reduction, the program has been lauded in the
international media and by global organizations as an example of how concerted legal action can
dramatically reduce deforestation rates in tropical nations.
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However, the extent to which the dramatic reduction in deforestation can be attributed to the
PPCDAm, rather than other factors affecting deforestation in tropical nations more broadly, has not been
investigated. Most prior studies have attempted to study individual components of the PPCDAm (Arima
et al., 2014; Assunção et al., 2013a,b; Assunção and Rocha, 2014; Cisneros et al., 2015). Disentangling the
individual effects of contemporaneously-implemented and spatially-correlated PPCDAm components is
difficult and, moreover, does not address the question of the overall impact of the coordinated initiative.
One study by (Assunção et al., 2015) attempted to simulate the overall impact by estimating a model that
interacted the policy implementation period with a measure of land tightness, which varied within
municipalities inside the Brazilian Legal Amazon and was theorized to moderate the effect of the PPCDAm.
By simulating the overall impact using data from municipalities within the BLA, the design likely
under-estimates the true effect of the PPCDAm because all municipalities are exposed to the initiative.
Estimating the effect of the PPCDAm on deforestation rates is difficult for two reason. First, only one
region the Brazilian Legal Amazon (BLA) has been treated (i.e., exposed to the PPCDAm). With a
treated sample size of one, statistical inference using standard methods is challenging. Second, one can
observe post-PPCDAm Amazonian deforestation rates, but one cannot observe the counterfactual
deforestation trends in the absence of the PPCDAm. Estimating these counterfactual trends requires
finding a suitable comparison region that was not exposed to the PPCDAm or a similar program. Brazil
and its Amazon region, however, are unique. Thus finding a comparison region(s) that represents the
Amazons counterfactual (no PPCDAm) deforestation trend is not straightforward.
Figure 2.1 shows the trend in the annual rate of forest change in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (BLA)
compared with (a) the average rate for 56 wet tropic forest countries and (b) the individual rates of the top
10 tropical countries with the most forest cover. Prior to the PPCDAm in 2004, the trends of the BLA and
the average of the 56 countries are moving in opposite directions. Given that the full pool of tropical
rainforest countries has a similar trend prior to PPCDAm, it would not be credible to assume that the
trends of the full pool could represent the BLAs counterfactual deforestation trend in the absence of the
PPCDAm.
To estimate this counterfactual deforestation trend, and to conduct statistical inference, I combined a
synthetic control design (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015) and newly available,
high-resolution satellite panel data on global forest cover change from 2001 to 2012 (Hansen et al., 2013).
The data-driven, synthetic control design offers a systematic and transparent method for choosing a
weighted set of comparison region(s) from the donor pool of tropical rainforest nations to serve as a control
group; i.e., I created a synthetic BLA from a weighted mixture of other wet tropical forest countries. The
intuition behind this design is that combination of several countries might produce better counterfactual
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Figure 2.1: Ratio of Deforestation to Forest Cover
representation of the BLA than could a single country or average across all countries. The annual trend in
ratio of deforestation to forest cover between the real BLA and the synthetic BLA are contrasted. In the
pre-PPCDAm period, we should observe no substantial differences in the deforestation rates of the BLA
and the synthetic BLA just as we would expect to observe in a randomized controlled trial. In the
post-PPCDAm period, any observed differences in deforestation rates between the BLA and the synthetic
BLA can be attributed to either the PPCDAm or to chance (sampling variability). To infer how likely any
observed differences are simply a result of sampling variability, rather than a real causal effect of the
PPCDAm, I used a randomization (permutation) statistical test (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie
et al., 2010, 2015). The intuition for this test is as follows: I falsely assigned the PPCDAm to other
countries (i.e., create placebo treatments), created a synthetic control for each placebo country, calculated
the true-synthetic difference in rates of forest cover loss, and asked, what proportion of the time do we seen
an effect at least as large as the one we see for the real PPCDAm? That proportion is a p-value.
To construct the synthetic BLA, I seek to ensure that the BLA and the synthetic BLA are similar in
terms of their pre-PPCDAm trends in the ratio of deforestation to forest cover, as well as in terms of their
values of strong predictors of deforestation, such as potential agricultural revenue, income per capita, areas
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protected by IUCN, and index of economic freedom for the associated country.
The results imply that the Brazilian Amazon experienced a decreasing rate of forest cover loss after
the implementation of the program in 2004 compared to its synthetic control. Cambodia and Paraguay are
the top two countries contributing to the synthetic BLA. This result is not surprising since these countries
have relatively similar annual rates of forest cover change, agricultural pressure to convert forest areas, rule
of law, and percent of land protected by the IUCN.
Despite these close similarities between the BLA and its synthetic control, the BLA experienced a
lower rate of forest cover loss than its synthetic control in the post-PPCDAm period (p=0.03). The
PPCDAm avoided deforestation of 88,841 km2 from 2005 to 2009 that is associated with 3,521 megatons of
C02 storage. This avoided deforestation estimate is higher than the simulated result by (Assunção et al.,
2015) of 73,000 km2 , as predicted given their design only used municipalities inside of the BLA, which were
all exposed to the PPCDAm. In contrast, this study constructed the counterfactual of the BLA using the
weighted combination of units outside of the BLA. Overall, the results are consistent with claims that
Brazils program to reduce deforestation was a dramatic success.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the key features of the PPCDAm and its
potential effect on deforestation. Section III describes the identification strategy, the data, and the donor
pool. I report summary statistics, test for balance across treated and untreated groups, and present main
results in Section IV. I conclude in section V.

2.2

Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal
Amazon (PPCDAm)

In July 2003, the Brazilian federal government established a Permanent Group of Interministrial Work
(GPTI). The GPTI coordinates the activities of thirteen ministries and is led by the Chief of Staff, one of
the highest offices of the federal government in Brazil. In March, 2004, the GPTI launched a set of
conservation initiatives known as the PPCDAm (Assunção et al., 2015). The PPCDAm comprised three
phases. The first phase (2004-2008) focused on land and territorial planning. The second phase
(2009-2011) emphasized monitoring and control. The third phase (2012-2015) promoted sustainable
production activities. At the same time, more targeted market-driven programs, such as the soy (2006) and
beef (2008) moratoria, were also implemented (Gollnow and Lakes, 2014).
The three phases of initiatives are closely connected, and each often builds upon its predecessor phase.
For example, INPEs Real-Time System for Detection of Deforestation (DETER) was created for the start
of the first phase but was enhanced for the second phase. In the first phase, hot spot monitoring delivered
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alerts about illegal deforestation every 15 days. In the second phase, daily alerts were available as well as
better coordination among enforcement agents. Throughout all phases, key ministries, state and municipal
governments, specialized organizations and civil society coordinated their activities, and this coordination
improved over time. Given the inter-connectedness of the three phases, this study defines the PPCDAm as
a large-set of initiatives started at the end of 2004 and continuously implemented afterward.

2.3

Identification Strategy & Data

2.3.1

Identification Strategy

Evaluation of a policy intervention that is implemented on one or few treated units (e.g., states, countries)
has generally been done using comparative case studies. In comparative case studies, the outcomes of the
treated unit(s) are compared with the outcomes of untreated unit(s) chosen by the analysts. This method
has come into question due to (i) the opaque or arbitrary methods used to select the untreated units and
(ii) the lack of attention paid to characterizing the uncertainty about whether the untreated units
approximate the counterfactual outcome for the treated unit.
An alternative method that is not subject to the same criticisms is the synthetic control method
(SCM) (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). SCM selects and weights comparison
untreated units to form a synthetic control unit using a transparent and systematic algorithm that draws
from the intuition that underlies the identification strategy often used in large-sample panel data analyses.
If the trends of the treated and synthetic units are similar for a time period prior to treatment assignment
(and other assumptions are invoked, like common responses to common shocks), it is plausible that the
synthetic units post-treatment outcomes represent the treated units counterfactual outcomes in the absence
of treatment. The SCM also lends itself to a randomization (permutation) test that allows the analyst to
characterize the uncertainty about whether the difference between the treated and synthetic control trends
result from chance.
I seek to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for the PPCDAm (the effect of
the PPCDAm on deforestation in the BLA). Following Abadie et al. (2010), the estimand is specified as:

αt = Yit1 − YitN

αt =the effect of the PPCDAm on deforestation in the BLA at time t
Yit1 = the observed deforestation in the BLA in the presence of the PPCDAm
YitN = the counterfactual deforestation in the BLA in the absence of the PPCDAm
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(6)

Suppose there are J+1 units that could be potentially exposed to the PPCDAm. Unit 1 is Brazil and
unit 2, ... , J are the potential control units. The set of potential comparison units is called donor pool, in
which there are J units of potential control. There are T time periods with 1, , 0 as the pre-intervention
periods and T0+1,...,T as the post-intervention periods. I assume the treated unit is uninterruptedly
exposed to the intervention in the post-treatment periods. Moreover, I assume: (i) deforesters did not
anticipate the PPCDAm and start changing their behaviors before the PPCDAm began; (ii)
no-interference between units i.e., changes in deforestation in Brazil did not affect deforestation in the
units that comprise the synthetic control); (iii) conditional mean independence in the untreated state
0
0
[E(Yt+1
− Yt0 | Brazil) = E(Yt+1
− Yt0 | Synthetic Control)], where Yt0 is deforestation in time period t in

the absence of the PPDAm; and (iv) common support with P (D) < 1 for Brazil and all units in the donor
pool. The plausibility of each of these assumptions is addressed below.
The goal is to estimate the effect of the intervention, αt , for post-intervention periods, t = T0+1 , , T .
Since YitN is not observed, I seek to estimate it using observable data from the donor pool. SCM applies
weights to the units in the donor pool to minimize the distance between pre-intervention characteristics for
Brazil (X 1 ) and pre-intervention characteristics for the untreated units (X 0 ). If W is a (J ∗ 1) vector that
weights the potential control units which reflect the importance of the units from the donor pool in the
synthetic control and V is a (k ∗ k) symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix that weights the importance of
each predictors used, SCM seeks W ∗ such that:

kX1 − X0 W kv s.t.(w2 ≥ 0, ..., wJ+1 ≥ 0)&(w2 + ... + wJ+1 = 1)
p
kX1 − X0 W kv = (X1 − X0 W )0 V (X1 − X0 W )

(7)
(8)

These weights are then multiplied by the deforestation outcomes of the untreated units in the donor pool
to estimate YitN . In other words, to find the effect of the PPCDAm, we estimate αt with:

α̂t = Yit1 −

J
X

Wj Yjt

(9)

j6=1

Another advantage of using SCM, introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Abadie et al. (2010,
2015), is the mode of statistical inference using a randomization test. The idea is similar to permutation
inference where the distribution of test statistic is computed under random permutations of the sample
units assignments to the intervention and non-intervention groups. This statistical inference through
randomization test is made possible by the fact that SCM chooses the synthetic controls systematically. To
conduct the test, I assigned treatment to all potential control units in the donor pool to make an inference
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about the size of the treatment effect from the true treated unit compared to the size of the treatment
effect from the placebo test.
One potential issue is the sensitivity of the results to the choice of countries in the synthetic control.
To perform a robustness check, I removed main donor countries to the synthetic control and re-do the
analysis to check the sensitivity of units chosen.
2.3.2

Data

Outcome Data. I use the ratio of deforestation to forest cover as the outcome of interest. Deforestation or
forest cover loss is defined as complete removal of tree cover. This data is derived from earth observation
satellite data for global map of forest loss published in Hansen et al. (2013). The Hansen data comes from
a high-resolution satellite, Landsat 7, at a spatial resolution of 30 meters from 2001 to 2012 that includes
all global land except for Antarctica and a number of Arctic islands. The baseline dataset for forest cover
was obtained from a global image of land cover in 2001. Change in land cover after the baseline period is
measured by Landsat 7 images that capture the clear-cut tree cover in a 30*30 meters per pixel resolution.
The published data by Hansen et al. (2013) only provides a count of cells that underwent forest cover
change in a given year. It does not provide the area of the cells. To estimate the forest cover change in a
given year, I used a forest cover threshold of 25%. The resulting outcome data is a .5 *.5 degree pixel that
has both forest cover and deforestation area in square kilometers for 225 countries. These .5 * .5 degree
pixel data are then aggregated over the boundaries of the BLA and other nations with tropical forests.
To check the validity of using this global forest loss data to measure the effects of PPCDAm on
deforestation in the BLA, I compared the data with deforestation data published by the Brazilian
government (INPEs Project for Monitoring Deforestation in the Legal Amazon; PRODES). Figure ??
compares the Brazil data from PRODES and from the global dataset. Overall, the estimates from the
global data are higher than those published by PRODES.
Furthermore, in three years (2003, 2010 and 2012), the sign of the change in deforestation differs in
the two datasets. These differences between the two data sets might arise from three differences in how the
deforestation estimates are generated:
(1) Type of satellites used to generate the data. PRODES uses the combination of Landsat 5,
CBERS-2, CBERS-2B, LISS-3, and UK- DMC2 to produce its satellite image for the BLA. (Hansen et al.,
2013) uses Landsat 7 data. As pointed out in Tropek et al. (2014), the Hansen et al. (2013) algorithm
focuses on calculating forest change on a global map and thus might lack precision at a local scale (it may
generate noisier estimates).
(2) Dates when the images were taken. PRODES takes a series of satellite images from June 1st until
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August 31st every year and chooses a cloud-free image from those produced. Hansen data takes the annual
cloud-free image at the end of the year.
(3) Period of time used to define a given years deforestation. Depending on the year, PRODES might
use anywhere from 10 to 12 months to estimate annual deforestation, whereas (Hansen et al., 2013)
consistently use a 12-month period.
To address concerns about these differences, I will replace the Hansen et al. estimates of deforestation
rates in the BLA with the estimates from PRODES in a sensitivity check.
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Figure 2.2: Annual Forest Cover Loss from Hansen and PRODES Datasets
Pre-treatment Outcome Data.I use all of the available pre-treatment deforestation estimates (2001 to
2004). For each year, the SCM algorithm will minimize the distance between the outcomes for the BLA
and its synthetic control. Pre-treatment outcomes capture both observed and unobserved characteristics
that drive deforestation in the BLA (Abadie et al., 2010). To further control for these characteristics, I also
seek to reduce differences between the BLA and its synthetic control across four other pre-treatment
variables for which there is a substantial body of research indicating a correlation between them and
deforestation, both globally and in the BLA in particular: agricultural returns, protected areas, economic
growth, and institutions (markets, government).
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Potential Agricultural Revenue. Brazil faces pressure for large-scale land transformation for
agricultural production (Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2015). In the BLA, agricultural expansion presents
important challenges on deforestation, especially from cattle ranching and soybeans production
(Caviglia-Harris, 2005; Nepstad et al., 2006). Thus, it is important to include the potential gross
agricultural revenue. This data, measured in USD per hectare annually, was obtained from Busch and
Engelmann (2015). They extended the work of Naidoo and Iwamura (2007) to map the economic benefits
from agricultural land by using the most lucrative crop that could be grown in every location every year
from 2001 to 2012. One of the disadvantages of this data is that it excludes the revenue from cattle due to
unavailability of potential production data. For the same reason, it also does not include revenues from
logging. Since these two commodities are important determinant for the BLA’s deforestation, I tested
whether my main specification is sensitive to the inclusion of cattle yield and non-coniferous round wood
export. Both of these covariates were obtained from FAOSTAT. The unit for the cattle yield is the carcass
weight (Hg) per animal, while the non-coniferous round wood export value is in USD.
Share of area protected by IUCN. Protected areas have been one of the effective method to conserve
forest (Andam et al., 2008). Because more strictly protected areas are not necessarily more protective
(Ferraro et al., 2013), I combined all protected areas IUCN category I-VI and normalized the protected
area with the total land area.
GDP per capita. Economic activity has been one of the important factors in forest conversion world
wide. Per capita GDP constant 2010 USD was obtained from World Development Indicator (WDI)
published by the World Bank. This variable represents the economic condition of the country with tropical
rainforests.
Index of Economic Freedom. This Index of Economic Freedom comes from the Heritage Foundation
and comprises rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and market openness. This covariate was
included as a measure of property rights insecurity that was uniformly measured across countries. In the
BLA, where forested areas are considered as unproductive and open for expropriation procedures, property
right insecurity reduces the present value of intact forests and triggers conversion of forests into
agricultural and pasture lands (Araujo et al., 2009; Alston et al., 2000).
In addition, I also check the balance on fixed covariates that represent geophysical characteristics of
the tropical rainforests (slope and elevation). Since these covariates are fixed, I did not include these
covariates in constructing the synthetic BLA.
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2.4

Pool of Countries

Before applying the SCM, I identified the pool of countries that will serve as a potential comparison for the
BLA. First, I chose only countries endowed with tropical rainforests. To identify whether a country has
tropical rainforests or not, I used the tropical rainforests definition by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).
Second, I chose only countries with a deforestation-to-forest-cover ratio lower than 0.015 from 2001 to
2004. This threshold was chosen to trim outliers. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the ratio during the
pre-treatment years: 98% of the tropical rainforest countries have ratios below 0.015. Two tropical
rainforest countries were excluded from the donor pool due to extreme values, namely Eritrea and
Grenada. Third, I chose countries that had non-missing values for all of the predictor variables. The
resulting donor pool comprises the 56 countries listed Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: 56 Tropical Rainforest Countries Donor Pool
Continent
(1)

Countries
(2)

Africa

Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda

Asia

Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam

Australia and Oceania

Australia, Fiji

North America

Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago

South America

Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela

Tropical rainforests are closed canopy forests growing within 28 degrees north or south of the equator and receive more than
200cm rainfall per year.
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Figure 2.3: Trimming Outliers
Figure (a) to (d) show the distribution of the ratio of deforestation to forest cover for the year 2001 to 2004 sequentially.
During pre-treatment years (2001-2004), 98% of the tropical rainforest countries have the ratio of deforestation to forest cover
below .015. Two countries with extreme values of ratio of deforestation to forest cover are Eritrea (figure (a)) and Grenada
(figure (b)).
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2.5
2.5.1

Results
Summary Statistics

Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the BLA and 56 tropical rainforest countries in the donor pool.
On average, from 2001 to 2004, the BLA has forest cover 17 times larger than the mean donor pool and its
forest loss was 34 times larger than the mean donor pool. The BLA’s position as the largest tropical
rainforest cover and the largest deforester in the world makes it difficult to find a comparison country that
will be a good counterfactual for the BLA. One of the reasons that the BLA’s forest cover loss is
substantially high compared to any other tropical rainforest countries is because the BLA’s forest cover is
also the highest in the world. Normalizing the BLA’s deforestation rates with its forest cover, the BLA’s
ratio of deforestation to forest cover is two times larger than the mean donor pool. Figure 2.4 shows the
ratio of deforestation to forest cover in the BLA compared to top 10 tropical countries with the most forest
cover and the average of tropical rainforest countries. Indonesia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
Bolivia had similar trend in the ratio of deforestation to forest cover as Brazil.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Donor Pool: Tropical Rainforest Countries

Covariates

Brazilian Legal Amazon

(1)

(2)

Mean
(3)

SD
(4)

Forest Covera
Forest Lossa
Ratio of Deforestation to Forest Covera

4,112,219
25,627.26
.0062376

240,722.2
755.73
.0032481

341,444.5
1,343.47
.002289

Potential Agricultural Revenuea
Share of Area Protected by IUCNa
GDP per capitaa
Index of Economic Freedoma

2,141.65
.1297125
8,980.27b
62.2b

2,208.696
.0992677
4,761.65
58.04

419.44
.0831201
8,113.57
10.13

Cattle Heada
Cattle Yield a
Soy Productiona
Soy Yielda

33,500,000b
368.1 b
45,800,000b
26,279b

1,919,863
3,052.88
1,601,690
13,700.27

5,233,027
18,997.84
5,623,981
6,664.367

Slope
Elevation

2.83
201.2

6.05
494.84

3.08
402.86

a
b

Mean 2001-2004
Values for Brazil, not only the BLA
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Figure 2.4: Annual Forest Cover Loss 2001-2012
Figure (a) shows that, from 2001 to 2004, the BLA has the highest forest loss compared to other tropical countries with high
forest cover.
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The BLA has higher deforestation rates, but does not have uniformly higher values than the mean
donor pool country for characteristics that are known to be positively correlated with deforestation. For
example, its potential agricultural revenues per hectare are lower and its share of protected land is higher
characteristics that are associated with lower deforestation. But it also has lower slope/elevation and
higher soybean production characteristics associated with higher deforestation. The BLAs variability
across these characteristics indicates that the average tropical country is unlikely to provide a valid
counterfactual for the BLA. It also highlights the importance of creating a synthetic control that looks
more similar to the BLA with regard to these characteristics.
2.5.2

SCM

I constructed a synthetic BLA as a convex combination of countries in the tropical rainforest donor pool
that are most similar to the BLA in terms of the pre-PPCDAm values of deforestation indicators. The
synthetic BLA accurately reproduces the pre-treatment deforestation rates and the values of the covariates
that predict changes in deforestation. Panel A of Table 2.3 shows the covariates differences among the
actual BLA, its synthetic control, and the entire donor pool. Columns (5) and (6) show the magnitude of
the differences in raw and normalized form. While the normalized differences between the BLA and the
entire donor pool range from 0.2 to 1.6, these differences are essentially zero between the BLA and its
synthetic control. In other words, the BLA and synthetic control achieve a degree of covariate balance
comparable to a completely randomized experiment (Imbens & Rubin, 2015).
Panel B of Table 2.3 shows the differences in biophysical characteristics between the BLA and its
synthetic control. These covariates were not included in constructing synthetic BLA. Forest area in
Synthetic BLA countries has higher slope and elevation compared to the BLA. However, the normalized
differences are below 0.25., the rule of thumb proposed by (Imbens & Rubin, 2015).
Figure 2.5 shows the time series of the outcome variable, ratio of deforestation to forest cover, for the
BLA (solid blue line) and its synthetic control (yellow dashed line). One of the advantages of the SCM is
its transparency in terms of showing the overall fit of the treated and untreated units. The overall
pre-treatment fit is shown graphically in the shaded area from 2001 to 2004 in Figure 2.5. This figure
shows that the synthetic BLA’s ratio of deforestation to forest cover 2001 to 2004 fit perfectly with the
BLA. Furthermore, the fit is measured numerically by the root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) of
the ratio of deforestation to forest cover that is very close to zero.
V-weights. . Recall that we must select weights for the predictor variables. Since the choice of these
V-weights influences the mean square error of the estimator and the combination of untreated units in the
synthetic control, I chose the V-weights based on the initial optimization of linear combinations of the
38

Table 2.3: Covariates: 57 Tropical Rainforest Countries
Panel A: SCM Covariates
Variable
(1)

Sample
(2)

Treated
(3)

Untreated
(4)

Diff.
(5)

Normalized Diff.
(6)

V-weights
(7)

Potential Agricultural
Revenue

Mean DP
Synth

2141.64563
2141.64563

2208.69561
2140.74387

67.04998
-0.90176

0.15985
-0.00666

0.075

Share of Area
Protected by IUCN

Mean DP
Synth

0.12971
0.12971

0.09927
0.12961

-0.03044
-1e-04

-0.36622
-0.00809

0.1

GDP per Capita
(Constant 2010 USD)

Mean DP
Synth

8980.26527
8980.26527

4761.64875
8954.47294

-4218.61652
-25.79232

-0.51995
-0.03904

0.1

Index of Economic
Freedom

Mean DP
Synth

62.2
62.2

58.04018
62.23448

-4.15982
0.03448

-0.41059
0.00891

0.075

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2001

Mean DP
Synth

0.00476
0.00476

0.00325
0.00477

-0.00151
0

-0.63983
0

0.2

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2002

Mean DP
Synth

0.0066
0.0066

0.00339
0.0066

-0.00321
-1e-05

-1.21132
-0.02439

0.2

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2003

Mean DP
Synth

0.00602
0.00602

0.00304
0.00602

-0.00297
0

-1.06835
0

0.05

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2004

Mean DP
Synth

0.00757
0.00757

0.00331
0.00757

-0.00426
0

-1.57196
0

0.2

Panel B: Fixed Covariates
Slope
Elevation

2.825
201.201

3.339
166.286

-0.514
34.915

Deforestation/ Forest Cover
0.020

0.015

Synthetic BLA

0.010

0.005

RMSPE=0.00000000001
0.000

BLA

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Year

Figure 2.5: Synthetic BLA
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-0.167
0.087

variables. Taking these initial optimization values, I re-assigned the v-weights to improve the balance on
covariates affecting deforestation in the BLA. The resulting v-weights for each covariate are shown in
column (7) in Table 2.3. Share of area protected by IUCN, for example, had a V-weight of 0.1. It indicates
that it has power to predict the ratio of deforestation to forest cover but less than the power from the
average pre-treatment ratios.
W-weights. Table 2.4 displays the weights of each control tropical rainforest countries in the synthetic
BLA. It demonstrates that the synthetic control is a weighted combination of all 56 countries (no country
receives zero weight), with Cambodia having the largest weight.

Table 2.4: Country Weights
Country

Weights

Cambodia

0.419

Paraguay

0.13

Malaysia

0.119

Singapore

0.104

Cuba

0.081

Australia

0.073

Belize

0.013

Laos

0.004

Guatemala, Venezuela, Dominican Republic

0.003

Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Indonesia

0.002

Nigeria, Sri Lanka, China, Benin, Ecuador, Rwanda, Hong Kong
Fiji, Thailand, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Philippines
Suriname, Cameroon, Guinea, Uganda, Bangladesh, Gabon, Malawi
Madagascar, Jamaica, Haiti, Bolivia, Vietnam, Equatorial Guinea
Tanzania, Mozambique, Republic of Congo, Colombia, Guayan, Costa Rica
Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya, India, Argentina, Panama,
Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, El Salvador

0.001

The effect of PPCDAm. The estimate of the effect of the PPCDAm on the ratio of deforestation to
forest cover in the BLA is shown graphically by the gap between the BLA (solid blue line) and synthetic
BLA (yelow dashed line) post-2004 in Figure 2.5. After the implementation of the PPCDAm in 2004, the
BLA’s ratio of deforestation to forest cover diverged away from its synthetic control. Since the
denominator of the ratio is the forest cover excluding forest regrowth, this figure shows that the BLA
experienced a decrease in deforestation while its synthetic control had an increase in deforestation.
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Figure 2.6 plots the yearly estimates of the impacts of the PPCDAm. Prior to the PPCDAm in 2001
to 2004 indicated by the shaded area, the gap (solid blue line) is zero. After the PPCDAm, the gap
diverted away from zero. It suggests that the PPCDAm had a large effect on deforestation rates and its
effect increased in time.

Gap Between Treated and Synthetic Control
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0.021
0.017
0.013
0.009
0.005
0.001
-0.003
-0.007

BLA

-0.011
-0.015
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2002
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2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Year

Figure 2.6: The effect of the PPCDAm in the BLA

Table 2.5 column (1) presents the gaps in ratio of deforestation to forest cover. Multiplying the gap
in ratio of deforestation to forest cover with annual forest cover in the BLA, column (3) shows the avoided
deforestation from the PPCDAM. From 2005 to 2009, the PPCDAm successfully avoided deforestation by
88,841km2 . Table 2.5 column (5) displays the conserved biomass from the avoided deforestation. To
calculate the BLA’s biomass, I overlaid Baccini et al. (2012) biomass layer with the BLA layer. The mean
of biomass in the BLA is 21,600 mg/km2 . From 2005 to 2009, the PPCDAm conserved 1,918,965,600 mg
of above ground biomass. To convert the above ground biomass into CO2, I used the coversion used in
Ferraro et al. (2015). Column (6) shows the CO2 storage assosicated with the avoided deforestation of
3,521 megatons from 2005 to 2009.
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Table 2.5: Avoided Deforestation and CO2 Storage

(1)

(2)

Forest Cover BLA
in sqkm
(3)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

-0.001
-0.002
-0.005
-0.005
-0.010
-0.013
-0.012
-0.009

4, 044, 308
4, 016, 746
3, 995, 568
3, 977, 231
3, 960, 046
3, 948, 123
3, 929, 643
3, 917, 320

3, 239
8, 139
20, 291
18, 726
38, 447
51, 811
45, 920
36, 047

69,962,400
175,802,400
438,285,600
404,481,600
830,455,200
1,119,117,600
991,872,000
778,615,200

128.4
322.6
804.3
742.2
1,523.9
2,053.6
1,820.1
1,428.8

Total 2005-2009
Total 2005-2012

-0.013
-0.047

19, 993, 900
31, 788, 986

88, 841
222, 620

1,918,965,600
4,808,592,000

3,521.3
8,823.8

Year

Gap

Avoided Deforestation
in sqkm
(4)

Biomass Baccini
in mg
(5)

CO2
in megatons
(6)

Inference. To make inference, I assigned the PPCDAm to one of the 56 control countries, shifting
BLA to the donor pool, and did it iteratively to each of the 56 control countries. It was as if the control
country would have passed the PPCDAm, instead of the BLA. I computed the estimated effect of the
PPCDAm from each of the placebo run. As Abadie et al. (2010) pointed out, this placebo tests provide
distribution of estimated gaps for the countries where no intervention took place. Since the synthetic BLA
produces excellent fit to the BLA prior to the PPCDAM, I removed control countries that did not have
overall fit higher than two times BLA’s MSPE. The total number of control countries in the placebo tests
is 32 tropical rainforest countries.
Figure 2.7 displays the effect of the PPCDAm in the BLA (blue thick line) and in the placebos (yellow
thin lines). Each placebo represents each iteration of assigning the PPCDAm to one of the control
countries. During 2005-2012 periods, the estimated gap for the BLA is unusally large relative to the
distribution of the gaps for the countries in the donor pool. Because Figure 2.7 includes 32 control
countries, the probability of estimating a gap of the magnitude of the gap for the BLA under a random
permutation of the intervention is 3.125% , lower than a conventional α of 5% for statistical significance
test.
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Figure 2.7: Placebo Test of the PPCDAm

2.6

Sensitivity Analysis

To address a concern that a particular country in the synthetic control might drive our results, I removed
the country contributed the highest to synthetic BLA, namely Cambodia. Table 2.6 the countries that
contribute to the synthetic BLA and their weights. Figure 2.8 shows the overall fit of the synthetic BLA
without Cambodia to the BLA. The RMSPE is close to zero and synthetic BLA fits the pre-treatment
outcomes trend. The effect of the PPCDAm in the BLA represented by the gap between the BLA (blue
solid line) and its synthetic control (yellow dashed line) is shown in Figure 2.8. Even after removing
Cambodia, the placebo test shown in Figure 2.9 indicates that the effect seen in the BLA is large relative
to the distribution of the gaps of the countries in the donor pool. The probability of estimating a gap in
the BLA under a random permutation of the intervention is 2.27%. In other words, there is no change in
the qualitative conclusion we draw from the analysis.
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Table 2.6: Covariates: 56 Tropical Rainforest Countries (Removing Cambodia)

(1)

Sample
(2)

Treated
(3)

Untreated
(4)

Diff.
(5)

Normalized Diff.
(6)

V-weights
(7)

Potential Agricultural
Revenue

Mean DP
Synth

2141.64563
2141.64563

2209.56031
2145.29325

67.91468
3.64762

0.16046
0.02829

0.075

Share of Area
Protected by IUCN

Mean DP
Synth

0.12971
0.12971

0.09706
0.12498

-0.03265
-0.00473

-0.39711
-0.40017

0.1

GDP per capita
(Constant 2010 USD)

Mean DP
Synth

8980.26527
8980.26527

4839.19721
8297.12418

-4141.06805
-683.14109

-0.50703
-1.36169

0.1

Index of Economic
Freedom

Mean DP
Synth

62.2
62.2

57.98136
63.08962

-4.21864
0.88962

-0.41299
0.25216

0.075

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2001

Mean DP
Synth

0.00476
0.00476

0.00325
0.00498

-0.00151
0.00022

-0.63445
0.75862

0.2

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2002

Mean DP
Synth

0.0066
0.0066

0.00334
0.00637

-0.00326
-0.00023

-1.23019
-0.58974

0.2

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2003

Mean DP
Synth

0.00602
0.00602

0.00298
0.00621

-0.00303
0.00019

-1.09386
0.44186

0.05

Ratio of Deforestation
to Forest Cover 2004

Mean DP
Synth

0.00757
0.00757

0.00321
0.00739

-0.00436
-0.00018

-1.65779
-0.36735

0.2

Panel B: Fixed Covariates
Slope
Elevation

2.825
201.201

3.466
232.724
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Figure 2.8: The effect of the PPCDAm in the BLA (Removing Cambodia)
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Figure 2.9: Placebo Test of the PPCDAm (Removing Cambodia)
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In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to my choice of predictor variables, I included
additional covariates of deforestation drivers in the BLA among the covariates used to construct the
synthetic control. Among them are cattle yield, soy yield, non-coniferous round wood export values, slope,
and elevation. Despite adding these predictors, the results are virtually unaffected. Figures 2.10 shows the
gap between the BLA and its synthetic control after adding more predictors. Appendix (Figure A1) show
the gaps for adding each individual predictor to the synthetic control formation.
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0.000
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Figure 2.10: Synthetic BLA: Adding All Covariates
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Finally, to address the concern of different deforestation rates from Hansen and PRODES datasets, I
replaced the BLA’s deforestation rates with the one produced by PRODES. Figure ?? shows the synthetic
BLA constructed by replacing deforestation data for the BLA with the one produced by PRODES. The
overall fit of the pre-treatment outcomes between BLA and its synthetic BLA is very close to zero. Similar
to the original estimates, the gap between the BLA and its synthetic control started to appear after 2004.
Figure 2.11 shows the gap in the BLA compared to the gap in each of the 22 control countries that produce
MSPE not higher than twice BLA’s MSPE. The cumulative gaps in ratio of deforestation to forest cover in
the BLA for 2005-2009 is -0.018, which is higher than the original estimation of -0.013. This difference may
be a result of more precise deforestation data from multiple satellites, or it may result from differences in
temporal aspects of the two data sets. Regardless, we come to the same conclusion: the PPCDAm
substantially decreased deforestation rates in the BLA.
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Figure 2.11: Gaps and Placebo Tests from PRODES data
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Conclusion
Deforestation has been a contributor to global greenhouse gas emission since 1870. Without a new forest
conservation policy, the extent of deforestation will grow to an unprecedented level. One country, Brazil,
which has the largest tropical rainforests and had the highest deforestation rates in the world, took the
step to combat deforestation in 2004. Thus, evaluating this large effort is important. However, estimating
the effect of the PPCDAm on deforestation rates is difficult because of limited treated unit (n=1) and
difficulties in finding BLA’s counterfactual. To address this issues, this study combined a synthetic control
design that systematically find a weighted control units for a limited treated unit and consolidated panel
data of forest cover change from Hansen et al. (2013) and other covariates affecting deforestation.
The results imply that the Brazilian Amazon experienced a decreasing rate of forest cover loss after the
implementation of the program in 2004 compared to its synthetic control. Cambodia and Paraguay are the
top two countries contributing to the synthetic BLA. From 2005-2009, the PPCDAm successfully avoided
deforestation by 88,841 km2 (p=0.03). CO2 storage associated with this avoided deforestation is 3,521 Mt.
This result is higher than the estimated counterfactual simulation result by Assunção et al. (2015) of
73,000 km2 . One of the reasons for this higher estimation is due to counterfactual unit used in the analysis.
Assunção et al. (2015) used municipalities inside of the BLA as their unit of analysis which might
underestimate the effect of the PPCDAm. Meanwhile, this study constructed the counterfactual of the
BLA using the weighted combination of units outside of the BLA. Overall, the results are consistent with
claims that Brazils program to reduce deforestation was a dramatic success.
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Appendices
Table A1: Common Support Assumptions
Covariates
(1)
PKH

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Min-Max PS
(2)
-2.915*
(1.659)
[-6.170 - 0.339]
-28.85***
(8.458)
[-45.44 - -12.26]

Common Support
(3)
-1.410
(1.112)
[-3.591 - 0.771]
-27.14***
(8.416)
[-43.65 - -10.63]

1 SD Caliper
(4)
-1.565
(1.184)
[-3.888 - 0.758]
-14.97***
(5.358)
[-25.48 - -4.459]

205,374
0.007

198,354
0.008

187,746
0.007

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Clustered s.e. at sub-district level
Standard errors in parentheses, 95 % confidence interval in brackets
Fixed effect controlling for average precipitation, average temperature, and year dummies

Table A2: Covariates Balance: Removing Neighbors

Variables
(1)
Number of PKH-Eligible HHs
Access to Health Facilities
Access to Education Facilities
Forest Loss 2006
Forest Loss 2007
Forest Loss 2008
Forest Cover 2008
Road Length 2010

Slope
Village Area (sqkm)

Matched
Unmatched
(2)

Mean
Treated
(3)

Mean
Untreated
(4)

Mean
Difference
(5)

Normalized
Difference
(6)

U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M
U
M

662.059
662.059
0.862
0.862
0.852
0.852
10.85
10.85
12.981
12.981
13.182
13.182
802.640
802.640
0.789
0.789

334.784
557.626
0.842
0.863
0.824
0.857
45.514
13.293
46.771
11.835
47.165
12.896
2582.812
760.336
1.206
0.720

327.275
104.433
0.02
-0.0005
0.028
-0.005
-34.664
-2.443
-33.79
1.146
-33.983
0.286
-1780.172
42.304
-0.417
0.062

0.761
0.206
0.111
-0.003
0.168
-0.036
-0.18
-0.029
-0.142
0.015
-0.188
0.004
-0.204
0.016
-0.176
0.039

-0.938
-0.432
-22.517
0.919

-0.199
-0.101
-0.222
0.026

Other Covariates not including in Matching
U
3.594
4.532
M
3.594
4.027
U
14.896
37.412
M
14.896
13.901
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Figure A1: Sensitivity Analysis: Adding Covariates
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